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Introduction 
Thinking with Spinoza about education involves thinking with and beyond his 
authored texts, situating his work within the tradition of Western thought, and 
exploring his contribution to the philosophy of education. This endeavour also 
involves taking up the multitude of secondary sources that have already put Spinoza 
to work in diverse and divergent manners, building on previous applications and 
interpretations of his ideas to show their relevance to contemporary educational 
problems. 
The task of thinking with Spinoza today demands both a close historical reading of 
original texts and the courage to make sense of concepts that originated in entirely 
different conditions. Key Spinozist terms such as intuitive knowledge, essence and 
eternity, for example, must be historicized while also being put to work in thinking 
through new problems (Lord, 2015; Voss, 2017). Spinoza’s thought is “a living 
anomaly that anticipates and can construct a different path for the development of 
thought and liberty” (Negri, 2013, p.15). This living anomaly continues to provide 
conditions that subversively open new paths for thought. New readings emerge, and 
bring forth new relevance. Deleuze (1988,1990), for instance, helped articulate 
issues with Hegel’s reading of Spinoza, underscoring the affirmative and constitutive 
nature of Spinoza’s naturalism, while Sharp (2011) moves away from humanist 
readings and finds textual support for an ontology of inhuman forces.  
Thinking with Spinoza about education is a practical affair that involves weaving 
historical threads together to make sense of the textured fabric of teaching and 
learning across different times and spaces. Authors in this collection resist a 
“charitable reading” that falls prey to the desire to imagine that “Spinoza got it 
right”. For instance, Spinoza has been considered the democratic philosopher of the 
multitude, but it is evident that his theory of power (as affect, and as directly 
corresponding to a particular image of right) troubles simplistic associations 
between his political theory and radical democracy (Kwek, 2015). Instead, each 
author, in their different way, performs careful readings and historical analyses that 
creatively build the case for the contemporary relevance of Spinoza’s concepts 
through a method that seeks the incongruences as well as the sympathetic lines of 
thought (Melamed, 2013b).  
Following in the spirit of Spinoza’s practical philosophy, the authors explore such 
questions as: How can Spinoza’s work support a robust ethical framework for 
contemporary education? How does Spinozist ontology help us to study student 
agency as distributed across material-affective assemblages? How can education 
research attend to the more-than-human? How might Spinoza’s notion of power and 
conatus be used to make sense of power relations in schools? And how can Spinoza’s 
adherence to the concept of necessity help us theorize the contingency of learning? 
These questions are addressed by modulating Spinoza’s concepts in a new milieu, 
reshaping and reanimating them through a contemporary encounter with his 
thought. 
Key themes 
Spinoza’s (1632-1677) monism, in which mind and body are expressions of one 
substance, was developed as an alternative to Cartesian dualist ontology. Spinoza 
identifies God with nature, rejects providence, and insists that humans are subject to 
the same laws of nature as is everything else. He argues tirelessly to separate reason 
from faith, to separate religion from state, and to defend the liberty of thought and 
speech. He was ostracized for his radical ideas, although his work subsequently 
influenced many thinkers, including philosophers, ecologists, sociologists, activity 
theorists, and political activists. 
Spinoza’s arguments find their pragmatic strength in his turn to the individual and 
their actions in relation to others; that is, in the individual’s enslavement to passions 
and the possibility of attaining freedom through collective belonging (Dahlbeck, 
2016; Duffy, 2006). Thus, LeBuffe (2010) argues that Spinoza offers a “moral 
theory” as part of his political theory and critique of religion. Joy is the threshold 
emotion that marks this collective achievement, distinguishing intuitive knowledge 
from mere reason. Joy in learning is not simply a means by which we affirm 
knowledge, but pertains to the content or essence of such knowledge (Curley, 1969, 
1973). In other words, only intuitive knowledge is knowledge of the actual essence 
of nature, an essence that refuses capture by any human image. Intuitive self-
knowledge becomes entirely singular then, insofar as it pertains to the unique 
essence of the particular modal expression in which we participate (Soyarslan, 
2013). And yet, this singular essence is also shared and transindividual, in the spirit 
of a new seventeenth century naturalism or empiricism (Martin, 2008; Negri, 2013). 
Spinoza posits conatus at the center of this ethics, a term that designates a body’s 
power to affect and be affected. Although conatus is associated with individuals and 
their attainment of perfection, it is not the simplistic and reductive Hobbesian will 
to persevere in itself, but rather the perseverance of perfection more generally 
(Youpa, 2003). Conatus is not focused only on the achievement of the organic body, 
but on a more general worlding process. This leads to insightful complications for 
those who extend the notion of individual and conatus to the state, larger 
communities, and institutions, as it suggests correlations between self-destruction 
and milieu-destruction that might be relevant to our current concerns with the 
Anthropocene. Rice (1990) suggests that Spinoza’s concept of the individual (and 
individuation) can be extended to think more complex physical bodies (perhaps 
ecological and cosmological), but should not be applied to sociological or political 
‘bodies’. These latter bodies, he claims, are for Spinoza structured according to 
human laws deduced from “human passional interaction” and thereby must be 
considered distinct from the laws of nature (Rice, 1990, p.278). This point is crucial 
if we are to avoid metaphysical reification of social aggregates and sustain the 
openness of the political collective. 
Deleuze (1988, 1990) characterizes Spinoza as a materialist, an immoralist, and an 
atheist. Spinoza would doubtless have refused such characterization, and yet 
Spinoza is explicitly anti-humanist in his refusal of anthropocentrism and in his 
pursuit of a more-than-human image of thought (Melamed, 2013a). Rather than 
celebrating human will and transcendent ideas, Spinoza directs our attention to the 
body and the movement of thought, emphasizing how thought is non-human and 
how all matter has the power to affect and be affected in varying degrees. Rather 
than subscribing to a morality of transcendent values, Spinoza proposes an ethics of 
encountering without judgment, an affirmation of joy and the devaluation of moral 
law. And in the spirit, if not the name, of atheism, Spinoza submits to a rigorous 
scientific approach and resists the all-too-easy turn to mystification when 
constructing his metaphysics. 
Building on, but diverging from, Deleuze’s interpretation, contemporary readings of 
Spinoza often emphasize a relational and inclusive ontology in which the more-
than-human collective is theorized and recognized (Braidotti, 2013). Spinoza offers 
an ethics well-suited to the current shift in the social sciences and post-humanities, 
as scholars turn to the intensive force of bodies and the expansive movement of 
non-human thought (Bennett, 2010; Dolphijn & Van der Tuin, 2012). This paradigm 
shift troubles conventional theories of learning, moving beyond notions of 
“distributed learning” that have been pervasive across the last century (Sorensen, 
2011). Scholars in education have mobilized this approach in their study of affect 
and resistance (Hickey-Moody & Malins, 2006). And yet, the question of what 
constitutes an ethics adequate to the new paradigm shift remains underexplored 
and demands attention. 
Overview 
This collection pursues the lines of thought described above, rigorously attending to 
the nuances of the original texts, while tracking significant implications of Spinozist 
thought in current education policy and practice. We are confident that this special 
issue makes important theoretical contributions to the study of education, because 
the authors respond to the burgeoning interest in Spinoza within education 
research. This work builds on the many interdisciplinary networks of Spinoza 
scholarship – see, for instance, the online Spinoza Research Network 
https://spinozaresearchnetwork.wordpress.com/ - and further develops the 
insightful reworking of his ideas by scholars such as Gilles Deleuze, Etienne Balibar, 
Antonio Negri and feminist scholars such as Genevieve Lloyd, Moira Gatens, Jane 
Bennett, Rosi Braidotti, and Elizabeth Grosz. 
We received about 40 abstracts in response to the call for this issue, reflecting the 
growing interest in this topic. Abstracts were submitted from all over the world - 
Israel, Saudi Arabia, Ireland, England, US, Canada, France, Spain, Brazil, Australia, 
Chile, and Germany. The selection of just eight articles was difficult. The articles 
included here cover a range of topics pertaining to the ethico-political project of 
education. The eight authors are accomplished scholars in philosophy, four working 
in philosophy departments, and four in education departments. 
The first article in this collection, by Maxime Rovere, describes Spinoza’s own 
education in Amsterdam under the tutelage of the Jesuit teacher Franciscus Van den 
Enden (1602 - 1674). Rovere shows that Van Den Enden used theatre and drama as 
part of his pedagogy, and that such pedagogy may have partially shaped Spinoza’s 
theory of affect and embodiment. She argues that this pedagogy addresses 
children’s emotional investment in ideas and utterances, shifting the focus from 
titles and honours to more affective dimensions of learning informed by a 
commitment to collective practices of feeling and thinking. 
The second article, by Aislinn O’Donnell, elaborates Spinoza’s philosophical 
arguments in order to show precisely how they serve to shift discourses and 
frameworks in philosophy of education and educational policy and practice. 
O’Donnell argues that a properly Spinozist understanding of education focuses on 
the practice of experimentation that undermines idealist images of perfection and 
draws attention to more-than-human learning events. 
The third article by Cristiano Rezende, performs a close exegetical reading of the 
Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect from the perspective of Spinoza’s gesture 
toward “a doctrine of children’s education”. Rezende argues that the emendation of 
the intellect entails a pedagogy directed at the immanence of error and mistaken 
belief, grounding education in the “correction” of the body, but without the usual 
moral demotion of the body that typically accompanies such learning. 
The fourth article, by Michael Roth, tracks the Spinozist lineage through Vygotsky’s 
social psychology, arguing that Vygotsky must be studied as a Spinozist philosopher 
of embodied learning. Roth argues that thinking with Spinoza about learning 
sciences, technology and mathematics can help to open up a post-constructivist 
research agenda in education. 
The fifth article, by Joanna Dennis, examines the development of co-operative 
schools within the United Kingdom, which have proved popular with teachers and 
parents. Using a theory of co-operative power developed from Spinoza, Dennis 
explores how these schools have emerged, with and against recent reform agendas, 
using narratives of hope and resistance. 
The sixth article, by Ian Leask, unpacks Althusser’s use of Spinoza in his political 
framing of education as the ultimate “ideological state apparatus”, mapping the links 
between imagination and ideology. Leask argues that Spinoza’s thought can help to 
shift our attention away from the individual teacher who struggles against this 
apparatus to the class as multitude and primary unit of pedagogical practice. 
The seventh article, by Maria Tamboukou, draws on Gatens’ and Lloyd’s (1999) use 
of Spinoza to argue that education can be an ethico-political practice, ‘a collective 
process of becoming-free’ (1999, 146). She analyzes archival material produced as 
part of the women’s worker education movement in New York and Paris spanning 
the period 1830-1950, to examine the role of joy and affect in educational 
empowerment. 
The final article, by Lesley LeGrange, questions the aspirations of the Deep Ecology 
Movement to expand morality to the more-than-human world using Spinoza to 
critique the anthropomorphizing of nature. LeGrange argues that Deleuze’s 
Spinozism can be read as preserving the ethico-normative distinctiveness of the 
human and he argues that this distinctiveness is central for (post)human education. 
Finally, Anna Hickey-Moody offers a brief synthesizing response to the collection, 
focusing on the ways in which the articles explore Spinoza's thought about the role 
of reason and imagination in teaching, learning and education policy. This encounter 
with the articles collected here provokes us to continue the task of thinking about 
education with the living anomaly of Spinoza’s thought. 
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